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fore the defendant cannot be held liable if his promise was not meant to be taken
seriously.
T-e interest in protecting against false claims is not so clearly satisfied. The
cliche that the Statute of Frauds should not be allowed to shield the perpetration
of a fraud is of little use because the Statute was enacted not for the purrose
of barring justified claims but out of a fear that justified claims could not be
distinguished from unjustified claims. 'he question is whether they can be more
easily distinguished in fraud than in contract actions. Two peculiarities of the
fraud action would seem to present a satisfactory answer to this question. In
the first place the plaintiff must prove that the intent of defendant, at the time
of the promise, was not to perform.91 This intent cannot be inferred from a
mere breach of the promise.92 Thus, proof of actual conduct manifesting such an
intent would be required, and this manifestation, in order to justify reliance,
would have had to occur upon a different occasion from the making of the
promise. Such manifestation would usually amount to something other than
mere statements to plaintiff subsequent to plaintiff's reliance; such a defendant
would not be likely to tell plaintiff that he had never intended to perform his
promise. Thus, independent proof of the requisite intent would tend to establish
the existence of the promise. The second distinguishing feature of a fraud action for
these purposes is the measure of damages. New York follows the "out of pocket"
rather than the "benefit of the bargain" rule in awarding damages in fraud
actions. The principle of indemnity is controlling. 3 The incentive to fabricate
false claims is greatly reduced because plaintiff can gain nothing; he can only
be restored to his position at the time of the alleged promise. Since the Statute
of Frauds is deemed a harsh and arbitrary measure and the courts have tended to
restrict its application, these substantive differences from the contract action
seem adequately to justify the Court's refusal to apply the Statute to a fraud
action like the present.
Unfair Business Competition
Plaintiff corporation was engaged in a business in which by contract with
individual householders, it sent out crews of men to perform ordinary house-
cleaning chores in an assembly-line manner. Defendants were several of its em-
ployees who had quit and formed a competing business for which they solicited
customers of plaintiff. Plaintiff in this action asked that they be restrained from
engaging in the same business as plaintiff, from soliciting its customers, and for
91. Adams v. Clark, 239 N.Y. 403, 146 N.E. 642 (1925).
92. Ibid.
93. Sager v. Friedman, 270 N.Y. 472, 1 N.E. 2d 971 (1936); Foster v. Dt Paolo,
236 N.Y. 132, 140 N.E. 220 (1923); Reno v. Bull, 226 N.Y. 546, 124 N.E. 144 (1919);
but cf. Hotaling v. Leach & Co., 247 N.Y. 84, 159 N.E. 870 (1928).
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an accounting and damages. The trial court dismissed the complaint,9 4 but the
Appellate Division reversed on the ground that defendants' plan and agreement,
formed during their employment by plaintiff, to quit et masse, establish a com-
peting business, and solicit plaintiff's customers constituted a conspiracy violative
of their duties to plaintiff as their employer."
The Court of Appeals held that plaintiff was entitled to relief from the
soliciting of its customers and therefore affirmed the order of the Appellate
Division remitting the case to Special Term.96 But the Court dismissed the
complaint insofar as it sought any further relief and rejected the notion that
defendants' plan to form a competing business constituted an unlawful conspiracy
and that defendants could be enjoined from competing.
Plaintiff's method of operation was not considered unique or secret in
nature, nor were defendants subject to any negative covenants. The Court dis-
tinguished the present fact situation from that of Duane Jones Co. v. Burke 
7
upon which the Appellate Division had based its finding of an illegal conspiracy
entitling plaintiff to the broad relief requested in its complaint. The Court found
that while the plan in Duane Jones was to so damage -and paralyze the plaintiff
corporation as to enable the defendants to take it over by a forced sale on their
own terms, there was no such purpose or effect in the present case.
In the Court's holding that defendants should be enjoined from soliciting
plaintiffs customers, the predominant consideration, was the 'considerable effogr
and expense undergone by plaintiff to obtain its customers. Only a small fraction
of all householders would be receptive to this type of service, and the discovery
of such potential customers required an extensive screening process. That defend-
ants were trying to iealize the benefits of plaintiffs efforts was shown by the
fact that their soliciting of patronage had been confined to plaintiffs' customers.
The Court held that since the customers were not readily discoverable by means
of public directories, by their locations, or by any advertised receptiveness to such
a business, but rather required substantial expense to become known and were
known to the employee only through his employment, the employee would not
be allowed to solicit these customers for a competing business, even after termi-
nating his employment.
This test, in which the accessibility of the customers is decisive is well sup-
94. Town and Country House and Home Service v. Newberry, 1 Misc.2d 294,
124 N.Y.S.2d 605 (Sup.Ct. 1953).
95. Town and Country House and Home Service v. Newberry, 1 A.D.2d 702,
147 N.Y.S.2d 550 (1st Dep't 1955).
96. Town and Country House and Home Service v. Newberry, 3 N.Y.2d 554,
170 N.Y.S.2d 328 (1958).
97. 306 N.Y. 172, 117 N.E.2d 237 (1954).
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ported by the authority relied upon by the Court.9 8 But the problem has often
been treated in terms of trade secret and violation of confidential relation.99 Such
an analysis, however, tends to confuse the issue, and to result in an overemphasis
of suc- facts as that there was no misuse of a written customer list,100 or that
the customers could be discove:ed by following plaintiff's route driver,10 1 and
consequent denial of relief. Whether the problem is put in terms of trade secret
or violation of confidential relation, the issue of accessibility remains certral. 102
And the test affirmed by the present case, in focusing attention upon the employer's
interest in his customers as well as the justification for the employee's action, is
realistic and direct.
98. Boosing v. Dorman, 148 App.Div. 824, 133 N.Y.Supp. 910 (4th Dep't 1912);
People's Coat, Apron and Towel Supply Co. v. Light, 171 App. Div. 671, 157
N.Y.Supp. 15, (2d Dep't 1916), aff'd 224 N.Y. 727, 121 N.E. 886 (1918); S.W. Scott
and Co. v. Scott, 186 App.Div. 518, 174 N.Y.Supp. 583 (1st Dep't 1919); Kleinfeld
v. Roburn Agencies, 270 App.Div. 509, 60 N.Y.S.2d 485 (1st Dep't 1946).
99. E.g., Progress Laundry Co. v. Hamilton, 208 Ky. 348, 270 S.W. 834 (1925);
Comment, Protection of Customer Lists in New York, 1 SYRAcusE L. REV. 110
(1949).
100. Progress Laundry Co. v. Hamilton, supra note 99. See Peerless Pattern
Co. v. Pictorial Review Co., 147 App.Div. 715, 132 N.Y.Supp. 37 (1st Dep't 1911).
in Fleisig v. Kossoff, 85 N.Y.S.2d 449 (Sup.Ct. 1948) the defendant testified that
he had not relied upon a list but had spent ten hours consulting classified direc-
tories under fifty industries and picked out the names of firms which he recalled
as customers of plaintiff. The court considered a finding that this testimony was
false and that defendant had actually relied upon a list as necessary to the
granting of an injunction.
101. Abdallah,v. Crandall, 273 App. Div. 131, 76 N.Y.S.2d 403 (3d Dep't 1948).
102. In comment cited note 99 supra the factor of accessibility is considered
under the headings "Whether the employee's knowledge of customers was a
matter of confidence or a trade secret" and "Whether or not the employee made
use of a written list of customers."
